According to the article documented below, it is likely that the traitors within the government and the U.S. military have acted to prevent an effective military response against the hijacking of planes and the attacks on 11 September 2001.
Answers Central Command Pentagon delayed several times Sept. 11
The National Military Command Center ( National Military Command Center, the NMCC) is the safest part of the Pentagon. During the attacks of 11 / 9, it was "the focal point of assistance within the Department of Defense" for policing in response to the hijacking of airplanes in U.S. airspace. [1] According to the Commission on 11 / 9, the work of the NMCC was to "bring the parties concerned to establish the chain of command between the National Command Authority - the president and defense minister - and those who were execute orders "[2] in response to the attacks on New York and Washington. That day, the NMCC was therefore a particularly crucial role. Yet the evidence suggests that the emergency actions taken by the Centre were totally inadequate. Many obstacles presented themselves: in addition to technical problems, outside agencies could not provide the necessary information to the Centre. Furthermore, several military leaders were slow to arrive at the NMCC where they could participate in emergency response efforts, they did not arrive until the end of attacks: it was too late to intervene. The data currently
available are insufficient to draw definitive conclusions. But many factors have impeded the actions of those present at the NMCC, combined with other oddities, raise the possibility of a deliberate and coordinated effort on the part of traitors to the U.S. government and military insiders to sabotage the Centre's ability to respond to the attacks of Sept. 11, when his immediate response was imperative.
"The nerve center U.S. ARMY WORLD"
The NMCC has been described as "a hub of communications, a standard for connecting the Pentagon, the civilian government, and the commanders of combat. "[3] It is a warren of offices, cubicles and conference rooms in an area where the Pentagon are the offices of the State Joint Staff and those of many senior officials, including Minister of Defense. The center is designed to operate in an emergency and has its own electrical, heating and air conditioning. [4] The main NMCC's task is to monitor events around the world for the Committee of Chiefs of Staff. His other main tasks are to provide an element of intelligence and crisis response. At the time of the attacks of 9 / 11, it's up to five teams in rotation, each management team is composed of 17 to 20 people responsible for various functions. [5]
OFFICERS LACK OF REACTIVITY IN RESPONSE TO THE FIRST CRASH
the morning of September 11, 2001, staff monitored the information that the NMCC received numerous live television, and staff present at the NMCC learned the first plane crash into the World Trade Center by the television news bulletins. [6] It would have been the first time they were informed of the crisis that was played in the skies over America that morning. [7]
NMCC staff did not realize that the crash was a terrorist attack. The Head of Operations, Dan Mangino, recalled: " At first we thought it was a terrible accident. [8] Major Charles Chambers:" I thought the pilot had used the laps to move into the zone, he lost consciousness, and that the autopilot had done the rest. "Therefore, at that time, " our apprehension of the crash ... was not different from that of everyone in the country ." [9]
In response, the Operations team advised the chain of command according to media reports, saying only to senior Pentagon officials that a plane had crashed against one of the WTC towers. [10]
NMCC IGNORE THE STAFF OF THE CURRENT CRISIS
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has informed the NMCC of the first hijacking of September 11th - American Airlines Flight 11 - as to 9:00, 14 minutes after the plane hit the World Trade Center and more than 45 minutes after her alleged embezzlement. It was then that Lt. Col. Ryan Gonsalves, Chief of Operations in the NMCC, seeking information on the crisis, called the operations center at FAA headquarters office in Washington. The person who answered told Gonsalves that the FAA had a report about the hijacking of Flight 11 left Boston for Los Angeles. However, the FAA employee did not seem to realize that this was the aircraft crashed into the WTC and he told Gonsalves that Flight 11 was "now underway" to JFK International Airport in New York. In addition, the FAA employee made no request for assistance from the army on the possible launch of alert fighters to catch the hijacked plane was not mentioned, and when Gonsalves asked if the FAA had need help with the hijacking, he was told: "No ", then the driver " called to say that everything was under control and that he would land in New York shortly ." [11] According to the instructions
military in response to a hijacking in the airspace United States, the FAA should have " notify the fastest ways " the NMCC. [12] Yet, as can be seen, the NMCC learned of the hijacking of Flight 11 when he called the FAA, not the reverse. The Report of the Commission on 11 / 9 noted that although the "e FAA headquarters began to follow the protocol of diversion " after air traffic controllers had concluded that Flight 11 was hijacked at about 8 am 25, she "had not contacted the NMCC to request an escort fighter ." [13]
Lack of awareness NMCC on the alarming crisis which unfolded this morning lasted, as was evident during the strike on the Pentagon at 09:37. Captain Charles Leidig, temporarily in charge of Operations in the NMCC when the terrorist attacks, told the Commission on 11 / 9 that: " he remembered he had told CNN the plane crash into the Pentagon . [14] Steve Hahn, an operations officer in the NMCC that morning, recalled: " I did not know [that the Pentagon had been hit] until I heard the newsletter on TV. " [15] Charles Chambers said that when the Pentagon was struck (the opposite side of the building where is located the NMCC), he " heard a faint rattling noise through the vents and felt a slight vibration. " However, Has he added, "I have not heard or felt on the other, so I never got more concerned ." He did not realize that the Pentagon was attacked when he saw that on TV. [16]
eerily quiet OFFICERS IN RESPONSE TO ATTACKS
NMCC staff saw live on TV Flight 175 from United Airlines hit the south tower of World Trade Center at 9:03. Then they would have realized what was happening. Leidig said that for him, "it was obvious he was a terrorist attack or a coordinated attack." Dan Mangino recalled that personnel at NMCC "immediately knew it was a terrorist attack." [17] According
Leidig, the NMCC " then became the focal point for coordinating information flow s." [18] Yet, given the fact that this was the first attack against America 60 years, the evidence suggests a level of urgency is much less than what one could reasonably expect from those present at the Centre. Mangino said: " he knew he would have little time in the coming days, he has made so quickly in the lobby to get money from an ATM ." He has returned to NMCC that shortly after 9:37, when the Pentagon was hit. Can an Army officer in a key position rushed out to take money from an ATM if sincerely believed that the United States were the center of a massive terrorist attack?
Even after striking the Pentagon, the NMCC staff remained very calm. When Mangino returned to the Centre, he was supposedly " greeted by a sea of calm ." He remembers that " There was no panic, not a loud voice. " His colleague Steve Hahn also noted that the atmosphere at NMCC " was very professional and very quiet. [19 ] And the Vice President of Chief of Defence Staff Richard Myers said that when he arrived in the NMCC at around 10 hours it seems, " all serving officers worked quietly at their posts, despite the smoke, suspended from the ventilation system, despite the fact that the Pentagon had been struck, and despite the outbreak of disrupting the evacuation alarm . "[20]
It is plausible that this calm is merely the demonstration of the professionalism of the NMCC. Mangino As noted," We train constantly to emergencies and training has been applied . "[21] But other evidence of lack of precipitation NMCC staff make this possibility less likely. It is particularly remarkable that the man who should have been in charge of the Centre's reply on the crisis was allowed to remain at a pre-planned meeting, unrelated attacks, and he got back on the job only more one hour after the second tower of the World Trade Center was hit.
NMCC IS THE DIRECTOR OF A MEETING PRE-PLANNED
The team leader General Montague Winfield, should have been in service at the head of the Operations team as Deputy Director for Operations (DDO) at NMCC during the attacks of 9 / 11. [22] During a crisis, the responsibilities include the establishment of the DDO and the moderation of a conference call between appropriate military commanders and other relevant agencies, and the establishment of a military response. [23] Curiously, however, the previous afternoon, Winfield had asked his colleague, Charles Leidig, to take over part of its task of DDO on the morning of September 11, Leidig agreed. Leidig - who served as assistant to the Operations Command Centre, responsible for maintenance, operation and training of monitoring teams NMCC - had joined the Directorate of Operations of the Joint Staff in July 2001 with the only qualification to that of DDO NMCC, about a month before 9 / 11. He did not experience that Winfield would certainly have been invaluable in organizing a response to attacks against the United States. [24]
The reason that Winfield had wanted to take his place Leidig DDO September 11 was that he had to attend a meeting this morning. It was a " closed-door meeting convened by the Air Force personnel to discuss the ratings of the Air Force officers "according to a memorandum from the Commission on 11 / 9. [25] Another memorandum from the Commission had described as a" session general officers to rate the Air Force. "On September 11, Leidig therefore replaced Winfield as DDO 8 h 30 or 16 minutes before the first plane hit the World Trade Center. [26]
One might reasonably expect that someone one is gone for Winfield at its meeting when the second plane struck the World Trade Center, if not before, and (soon) that officers at NMCC "knew immediately that it was a terrorist attack." [27] Yet he did not. Winfield did not return to his post as more than an hour later, after the alleged crash of Flight 93 in Pennsylvania after the attacks of 9 / 11 completed. It is unclear whether Winfield and the other officers at the meeting were immediately informed of the second attack. It is also difficult to know exactly when Winfield returned to the NMCC, and if he immediately resumed his duties as DDO, or if allowed to continue Leidig in his place when he could resume his post. Leidig told the Commission on 11 / 9 be " certain that Winfield had returned" Meeting " after striking the Pentagon " to 9 h 37. [28] He also said that Winfield was replaced as DDO " just after we had learned what was going on with United 93 ", ie just after 10 pm 03. Leidig said the report by conference call on an anonymous threat against Air Force One took place at 10 h 37, " just after I found Surveillance by General Winfield. [29] This would indicate that Winfield returned to his post around 10:30.
The best explanation for the Commission on 11 / 9 provided on Winfield and breach of its core responsibilities, as it was in a place of no importance at the pre-planned, was specified in a note: "these meetings like the one attended Winfield are generally not interrupted unless a compelling reason. " [30] But a major terrorist attack in the United States is highly significant, why Winfield was not immediately returned to his position when the second WTC tower was hit? Why nobody NMCC is quickly went to him at the meeting at this time?
Considering the countless quirks identified in response to military attacks of 11 / 9, we should probably consider the possibility of a more sinister explanation for this apparent lack of urgency among those whose job was to operate the NMCC September 11. For example, they would calm it because they thought that terrorist attacks were a simulation as part of a training exercise that morning rather than actual real emergency? In such circumstances, it would have been much easier to remain calm. It is possible that people may have thought the NMCC that the terrorist attacks were simulated, even when TV images showed clearly what was happening. For example, the staff of a military base near New York who led a training exercise against terrorism this morning, thought that television pictures of the WTC on fire were actually developed a training video to accompany their exercise. An employee told a coach: " This time, you really outdid . [31]
CONFERENCE EMERGENCY only begins 9:29
Another area of concern: the serious problems encountered by staff in the NMCC in the organization and execution of an emergency teleconference to respond to terrorist attacks. The NMCC had specific procedures for crisis management. A memorandum from the Commission on 11 / 9 described it: " when a particular event occurs, the first action is to convene a major conference to gather and disseminate information from government entities according to established checklists. "[32] However, Charles Chambers recalled that the conference a major event in response to the attacks of 11 / 9 at NMCC" took more time than expected to implement . "[33] The Commander Patrick Gardner, Deputy DDO, told the Commission on 11 / 9 that the NMCC " has struggled to establish a conference " who " has not taken off as quickly as expected " he s 'was frustrated " it has not been put in place more quickly ." [34] conference a major event started only 9 am 29 or 26 minutes after entering the Flight 175 into the World Trade Center. [35]
At least two factors identified contributed to this alarming delay in the establishment of the conference: the disruption caused by [lack of] certain officers of the NMCC who would participate in another conference call, but [anyway] would have been useless in helping the emergency following the attacks, and also some problems connecting with other agencies - Especially the FAA - the conference of NMCC.
CONFERENCE UNNECESSARY DELAY OF THE CIA'S RESPONSE NMCC
A telephone conference of the National Surveillance and Intelligence Operations (NOIWON) was convened by the CIA, probably between 9:25 a.m. 9:16 a.m. ET on September 11 for allow government agencies in the Washington area quickly share information about the ongoing crisis. [36] But this call seems to have hindered rather than supported the efforts of emergency response. According to a note from the Commission on 11 / 9, the call of "NOIWON" occurred while that the NMCC was preparing for the conference a major event. The NMCC has abandoned its attempt to convene a [major conference a major event] so that its surveillance officers can participate in the conference NOIWON. "[37] Moreover, this disturbance apparently intervened to nothing. An intelligence officer working at FAA headquarters that morning said he "did not remember information useful or important in the call of NOIWON. "[38] Charles Leidig told the Commission on 11 / 9 he did not remember " a situational awareness on the part of NOIWON . "[39]
NMCC THE MEETING OF THE PROBLEMS TO CONNECT TO CIVILIAN AGENCIES
Attempts to call the conference a major event were also delayed because, as Charles Chambers pointed out," civilian agencies "that should be added to the conference" could not be contacted, others were cut after a while the connection . "[40] Leidig finally announced that the NMCC would start without these agencies could join later in the conference. [41] conference event Major ended after five minutes, then was resumed at 9 am 37 as an "air threat conference " which lasted over eight hours. [42] According to Chambers, the air threat conference occur when aircraft are considered hostile, they require many more people to a conference of major events. But as the previous conference, "it took more time than expected" to convene the conference aerial threat. There was still having trouble connecting with some agencies. Other agencies have not understood what it meant Leidig about a new conference, did not hang up when the last conference call had been disconnected. Therefore, according to Chambers: "All we heard of them, it was a busy signal. " [43]
FAA NOT COMMUNICATION
Considering the crucial responsibilities of FAA vis-à-vis the hijacking, serious problems connecting to the agency at the NMCC conference calls of particular concern. According to military instructions, the administrator of the FAA " exclusive responsibility to ensure the maintenance of order related to the hijacking or attempted hijacking in the special aircraft jurisdiction of the United States. "[44] But when he asked the FAA to provide an update on the conference a major event from its inception, the line was silent. [45] Charles Leidig said that the FAA was in line " intermittently "and" most of the time she was out of conference. "He says trouble connecting to the FAA at the conference that took place" all morning ... had hindered some extent the flow of information. " [46] Charles Chambers complained because" FAA did not participate in the conference, they could not connect in safe mode, and we could not obtain first-hand information from them. "[47] According to the report of the Commission on 11 / 9, although the operators NMCC" have worked tirelessly to include the FAA "in the conference, they met" problems of equipment and difficulty finding secure phone numbers. "[48] Sergeant Val Harrison responsible for setting up conference calls at NMCC, tried to contact the Operations Center at FAA headquarters to connect the agency's air threat conference, but did not succeed. To achieve this, she finally asked the standard of the White House, but even after the establishment of liaison with the FAA, it was repeatedly lost. [49]
The explanations have been advanced to explain these problems in connecting the FAA at the conference were at best approximate. A memorandum from the Commission on 11 / 9 are attributed simply to "problems technical. "[50] Leidig told the Commission on 11 / 9 that he understood there had been" compatibility issues "between the phone's secure FAA and NMCC secure telephones, but unaware of the technical aspects of the problem. [51] In light of many other factors that disrupted the emergency response NMCC that morning, it would be useful to check if these problems were not in fact the result a deliberate attempt to sabotage the communications between government agencies designed to ensure that the attacks on New York and Washington would take place without hindrance.
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE FAA DOES NOT RELEVANT INFORMATION
Moreover, when at 10:17 a representative of the FAA finally joined the air threat conference, it was not the appropriate person to provide required information. The representative, Rayford Brooks worked at the Central Altitude Reservation (CARF) to the command center at the FAA Herndon, Virginia. Brooks was quite incompetent to represent the FAA at the conference. According to the report of the Commission on 11 / 9, he had "no knowledge or responsibility for hijackings, no access to decision makers, and none of the information available to senior FAA officials. "Brooks did not listen the radio (in his car) before arriving at the Command Center about 9:30 am. As he told the Commission on 11 / 9, he was" unaware of the situation. "After arriving at the Command Center, Brooks received no instruction about the air threat conference or other operational issues. From the beginning, Brooks should not have participated in the conference. He had joined in place of one of the military officers working in the cell of Air Traffic Services (ATSC), a small office next to the CARF Command Centre. According to Brooks, the ATSC asked CARF monitor the air threat conference on his behalf because there was no phone function secure. [52] Considering the crucial role that the FAA was asked to play in addressing the hijacking, one might reasonably expect an employee of the FAA informed that more Rayford Brooks participated in the conference NMCC during the hijacking. Among those who worked at the command center of the FAA that morning, was there really no one more qualified?
OFFICERS ARRIVE TOO LATE TO HELP THEM TO BRING NMCC
We can see that in response to the attacks of 9 / 11, many factors have hampered the actions of those present at the NMCC. It is also interesting to note that several key officials, who normally should have been present at the NMCC, were not at the Center during the attacks, they did not arrive until it was already too late to intervene :
- As already mentioned, Brigadier General Montague Winfield had stepped down as Deputy Director for Operations in the NMCC at 8:30, and had resumed his duties after the end of attacks, probably around 10:30.
- Donald Rumsfeld who, as Minister of Defense has a vital role to play in defending his country against terrorist attacks, was at the Pentagon that morning. Yet it is also arrived in the NMCC until after the attacks. Rumsfeld was informed of the first attack in New York at a breakfast Working with several members of Congress. He then returned to his office for the daily briefing with intelligence from the CIA. [53] After the second plane hit the WTC, colleagues of Mr. Rumsfeld came to inform him of the situation and told him that the crisis management process had been initiated. But Rumsfeld had "wanted to spend a few phone calls" and thus remained in his office. [54] Having heard and felt the explosion when the Pentagon was struck, Rumsfeld did not go immediately to the NMCC. He went to help carry an injured person on a stretcher. Back in the building, He went first to his office. [55] He finally arrived in the NMCC and joined the air threat conference around 10:30. [56] Lieutenant-Colonel Robert Darling - who took office September 11 liaison between Vice President Dick Cheney in the situation room at the White House and the NMCC - described the problem in the actions of Mr. Rumsfeld that morning. Darling wrote: "... I think the appropriate place to have Secretary Rumsfeld was in charge of the NMCC that day ... the real questions remain: why Secretary Rumsfeld he abandoned his post that day without answering the National Military Command Center at a time when our country was attacked? "[57]
- When the terrorist attacks took place, General Henry Shelton, who as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staffs Joint was the the highest ranking military officer in the U.S. armed forces, took off around 7:30 am aboard a military plane, flying over the Atlantic to attend a NATO conference in Hungary. Shelton ordered turn around and returned to Washington. [58] However, he arrived in the NMCC until about 5:40 p.m. [59]
- This morning, General Richard Myers, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Joint Staffs, was on Capitol Hill, and although he saw the images of the first crash in New York to television shortly before 09:00, he continued his scheduled meeting with Senator Max Cleland. [60] Myers told the second attack on the WTC was when Cleland was with or immediately after leaving the meeting (conflict between the reports on this). [61] Some reports indicate that Myers had left the Capitol to return to the Pentagon during the Pentagon attack. [62] Myers told the Commission on 11 / 9 that he had arrived at the NMCC around 10:00 or 10:10 [63] But he had also delayed its participation in the conference air threat by leaving the NMCC to go offices of the Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld seeking. Only after an assistant told him that Rumsfeld was out as Myers returned to the NMCC. [64]
- As Director of Operations for the Joint Staff, Vice Admiral Scott Fry was "responsible for the proper functioning of the National Military Command Center ," according to the authors Patrick Creed and Rick Newman. [65] Although he was informed of the first strike on the WTC, as he was leaving his office at the Pentagon, Fry went to his appointment from 9:00 am at the dentist. He interrupted the meeting upon receipt of the appeal of his assistant on his cell phone when the second plane hitting the World Trade Center. But then Fry instead of going to the NMCC, went to the Executive Center on the upper floors. [66] Fry had traveled to NMCC later that day, although the time of his arrival and his participation in the conference threat Air is not established ... [67]
Any new survey on 11 / 9 should determine how the absence of these senior NMCC has hampered the army's response to the attacks. In light of all the other suspicious evidence, one should seriously consider whether the absence of either of them was pre-organized as part of a deliberate attempt to cripple the U.S. Army prevent it from stopping the attacks.
EVIDENCE DETAILED ACTIONS OF THE NMCC 11 / 9 ARE NOT REVEALED
We know of several records that could say more about what happened on September 11, 2001 NMCC. These records would certainly be very useful for further investigations. They include a report after the action produced by the NMCC, on its response to the attacks of 11 / 9 which is based on notes and other documents of the time. [68] We also know that calling the conference NMCC's air threat has been registered, and that the Pentagon has produced 200 pages of classified transcript of the recording. [69] In addition, a senior NMCC has told the Commission on 11 / 9 that it has withdrawn all the tapes phones and other devices to NMCC after the attacks of 9 / 11, and put them safely in the office of the DDO. Presumably these bands still exist. [70]
Even without access to records as important as these, the already limited evidence available indicates that an alarming number of factors have hampered the emergency response to the attacks of 11 / 9 coordinated within the NMCC. Given the failure of the U.S. military to stop these attacks, there is much cause for concern. We need to know much more about what happened Sept. 11 at NMCC. Serious attempts should be undertaken to determine if deliberate and coordinated actions were carried out by traitors to the U.S. government and military insiders to disrupt efforts to implement an effective response to attacks within the NMCC.
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